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Game theory in international relationship

28 7月

When I read the historic events between China and Tibet-in-exile, again I noticed this strange phenomenon, the radical factor in Tibetan always fueled the hand of hard-liner in Beijing and weaken the moderate Chinese. The moderate’s policy of more ethnically sensitive fostered the Tibetan’s national emotion and finally led to their increasing independence claim. In such case, hard-liner came into power and ruthlessly squeezed the religious and culture freedom; in return, such hard policy increased the possibility of violent opposition in Tibet by radical Tibetans and non-violent Dalai Lama got doubted.

The same story repeated in circles of internaltion relationship such as Taiwan strait relationship, Palestine-Israel conflict and so on. Ironically, the best friend of hard-liner A is hard-liner B in opponents’ camp. When Sharon struck hard on Palestine, Fatah’s base was challenged and radical Hamas won more support.

I think such phenomenon can be explained well by Game theory. And that’s a good topic for a serious research. According to Game theory, such scenario will only occur when two participators are in a short-round trade. If both sides feel they have to develop long trade relationship they will return to more moderate position and start to co-operate.

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Posted by 于 七月 28, 2006 in 每日杂谈

 

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